Abstract. In this paper we present the first related-key rectangle cryptanalysis of 185.59 bytes memory. These are the currently best cryptanalytic results on Rijndael-160/160 and in terms of the number of attacked rounds. Furthermore, our results show that the slow diffusion in the key schedule of Rijndael makes it a target for this type of analysis.
Introduction
Block ciphers are used widely in cryptography to ensure confidentiality and authenticity. They are needed both in software and in hardware. For example, they are used in electronic payments or for wireless security. For different demands, different algorithms are designed [1] [2] [3] and they have been standardised as well. Apart from this main functionality, block ciphers are also used as underlying primitives in the design of hash functions or pseudo-random number generators.
Rijndael [2] is a block cipher designed by Daemen and Rijmen and is a substitution-permutation network following the wide-trail strategy. Both the block length and the key length can be any multiple of 32 bits, with a minimum of 128 bits and a maximum of 256 bits, independently of each other with key size greater than or equal to block size. The 128-bit block variant of Rijndael has been chosen as the Advanced Encryption Rijndael-160/160 6 2 Outline. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give a brief description of Rijndael and the notations used in our analysis. Section 3 introduces the rectangle attack briefly and shows our rectangle distinguishers. We demonstrate our attacks on Rijndael-160/160 and in Sections 5 and 6, respectively. Finally, Section 7 concludes this paper.
Description of Rijndael and Notations
In Rijndael, each data block (plaintext, ciphertext, subkey, or intermediate step) is represented by a 4 × N b state matrix of bytes, where N b is the block size divided by 32. The state is then transformed by iterating a round function. The round function is composed of the following four operations:
-SubBytes (SB) : a non-linear byte substitution (8 × 8-bit S-box) that acts on every byte of the state.
-ShiftRows (SR): a cyclic shift of bytes in a row that acts individually on each of the last three rows of the state. The shift offset C i of row i depends on the block length N b (See Fig. 1 ). -MixColumns (MC): a linear transformation (based on an [8, 4, 5] MDS code over GF (2 8 )) that acts independently on every column of the state -AddRoundKey (AK): the exclusive-or of the round key with the intermediate state.
The number of rounds for the cipher N r varies with N b and N k (the key size divided by 32). Before the first round, there exists a whitening layer consisting of AddRoundKey only, and in the last round the MixColumns operation is omitted. We assume that this is also the case for the reduced round versions of Rijndael. 
where ≪ denotes the rotation of the word to the left and Rcon[·] denotes the fixed constants. Then the round key RK i is given by the words
The key expansion and the the round key selection of Rijndael-160/160 are illustrated in Figure 2 . Here we only give a brief description of Rijndael, for more detailed specification of the cipher, we refer to [2] . Notation: The notation that we will use throughout this paper is as follows:
the byte at row i column j of the plaintext state the SB operation on the byte at row i column j of the state matrix
the SB operation on the subset bytes {(i, j)} of the state matrix
The rectangle attack introduced by Biham et al. [32] aims to reduce the complexity of the differential cryptanalysis. The main idea is to use two short differential characteristics with high probabilities instead of one long characteristic with a lower probability. It is also possible to combine rectangle attack with relatedkey attack to derive the related-key rectangle attack [36] in which the attacker can query to the cipher with other keys that have a specified relation (often an xor-difference) with the original key. Let the encryption function E of the block cipher be considered as a cascade of two sub-ciphers E = E 1 • E 0 . Assume that there exists a related-key differential α → β for E 0 under the key difference ∆K ab with probability p, i.e., (Pr[E 0 (P, K) ⊕ E 0 ((P ⊕ α), (K ⊕ ∆K ab )) = β] = p). Similarly, assume that there exists a related-key differential γ → δ for E 1 under the key difference ∆K ac with probability q, where ∆K ab and ∆K ac are the key differences known by the attackers. A related-key rectangle distinguisher is then as follows:
1. Choose N plaintext pairs (P a , P b ) with P b = P a ⊕ α at random. Ask for the encryption of P a under K a and of P b under K b , respectively, where
Choose N plaintext pairs (P c , P d ) with P d = P c ⊕ α at random. Ask for the encryption of P c under K c and of
If yes, we call it a right rectangle quartet. Fig. 3 illustrates the related-key rectangle distinguisher.
The related-key rectangle attack can be mounted for all possible β's and γ's simultaneously. Firstly, we can use any γ for which γ
E1
− − → δ holds. This is equivalent to mounting the attack for all values of γ with the condition (E 0 (P a ), E 0 (P c )) and (E 0 (P b ), E 0 (P d )) have the same difference (γ). In this case the probability that conditions of the distinguisher are satisfied is
where n is the block size, andq =
Similarly, we can use all β values simultaneously as well. Conditions for this case become:
and the quartet has probability P r 2 [γ → δ] to become a right quartet. Hence, the probability that a given quartet is a right quartet is
Therefore starting with N plaintext pairs with difference α, we expect to find N 2 2 −n (pq) 2 right quartets. For an ideal cipher, Step 3 is expected to hold with probability 2 −2n . Therefore, ifpq ≫ 2 −n/2 , the algorithm above allows to distinguish E from an ideal cipher. We refer to [32, 36, 42, 43] for more detail. A local collision is a differential that starts and ends with the zero difference in the internal state, but is non-zero in the middle. The idea of local collisions has been first introduced by Joux and Chabaud [44] to attack hash functions. It aims to inject a difference (called disturbance, in red) into an intermediate step and then to correct the resulting differences with the injections in the next steps (called correction, in grey) to obtain a collision. The goal is to reduce the complexity of the attack by having as few disturbances as possible. This idea has been later successfully applied to block ciphers in [18] . A local collision of Rijndael-160/160 is shown in Fig. 4 .
In order to construct an optimal trail, first of all we construct a minimal-weight disturbance layer, which will become a part of the key schedule difference. Then, correction layer is constructed by encrypting on the previous round of the disturbance layer. The key schedule difference is the sum of the disturbance and the correction layers. The 4-round Rijndael-160/160 key schedule difference constructed from local collisions is illustrated in Fig. 5 . We follow this approach in our analysis of Rijndael-160/160 and Rijndael-192/192.
The Related Keys
In order to mount the related-key attacks presented in this paper, the adversary needs to construct the relations between different keys as follows.
Regarding Rijndael-160/160, for a secret key K a , which the attacker tries to find, we define a simple form of this relation as xor with a constant to obtain K b :
ab , where the constant ∆K 0 ab is chosen in advance (see Table 2 ). Then we compute the subkeys K For Rijndael-192/192, a more complex non-linear forms of the relation between the keys will be adopted. We choose a desired XOR relation in the second subkey as ∆K 1 ab , and then define the implied relation between the actual keys K a and K b as:
where F represents a single round of the Rijndael-192/192 key schedule. Similar to Rijndael-160/160, we can define the relation between K b , K c and K d for Rijndael-192/192 (see Table 3 ).
Rectangle Switch
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However, due to the flexibility of the SB operation (i.e., it is applied to each byte in the state independently), this choice of E 0 , E 1 can be done in a more clever way. Let {(i, j)} and {(i ′ , j ′ )} be subsets of the state set,
be the SB operations on the bytes {(i, j)} and {(i ′ , j ′ )}, respectively. Then E 0 and E 1 can alternatively be defined as follows:
where {(i, j)} is the absolute complement of {(i ′ , j ′ )} in the state set, and the bytes (i, j) and (i ′ , j ′ ) are passive in E 0 and E 1 , respectively. For example, in our rectangle distinguisher of Rijndael-160/160, we take m = 2, n = 4. The first subcipher E 0 covers rounds 2-3 of Rijndael-160/160 and SB operations on 12 bytes (i, j) in round 4, where 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 and 1 ≤ j ≤ 4; The second subcipher E 1 starts with the SB operations on 8 bytes (i
, followed by AK • M C • SR and rounds 5-7. Our 6-round rectangle distinguisher is illustrated in Fig. 7 .
The Rectangle Distinguishers
In the analysis of Rijndael-160/160, we use a 6-round rectangle distinguisher, and extend one round before and after the distinguisher respectively (see Fig. 7 ). Our rectangle distinguisher covers rounds 2-7 and we use the switch technique in round 4 to avoid the active S-boxes in the key schedule and hence to reduce the complexity of our attack. We take m = 2 and n = 4 in Equation (1) to obtain E 0 and E 1 .
The plaintext difference α is specified in 16 bytes, two of them (denoted in dark green) can take any value whereas the remaining ones (denoted in gray) are fixed to (0x3e,0x1f,0x1f,0x21)
T . The key difference is chosen such that when it is xored to the state, all differences cancel each other except the two bytes at (0, 0) and (0, 2) of the top characteristic. For the differences in these two active bytes we have:
This guarantees that the input differences to the S-box operations in all the internal states (except the ones specified in Equation 2) are 0x01. For the active bytes in round 2 of the top characteristic, we adopt 0x1f as the output difference of SB operation in order to achieve the optimal differential probability 2 −6 . We develop the bottom characteristic by taking an similar approach. As to the active byte in round 3 of the top characteristic, there are 127 possibilities of the output difference for the input difference 0x01 according to the differential distribution table of SB operation, among which one happens with the probability 2 −6 , the others happen with probability 2 −7 . Then we construct the 6-round related-key rectangle distinguisher by combining the 127 top characteristics and one bottom characteristic mentioned above.
The probability of the 6-round distinguisher can be computed as follows.
-There are three active S-boxes in rounds 2-3, thus the probability of the 127 differentials for E 0 can be
-There are five active S-boxes in rounds 4-7, thus the probability of the differential for E 1 isq = (2 −6 ) 5 = 2 −30 . -In total, the probability of this distinguisher can be calculated as (2 −10.
Similarly, we find a 8-round rectangle distinguisher for Rijndael-192/192 which covers rounds 2-9, and the rectangle switch technique is applied at round 6 (see Fig. 8 ). There are 9 active S-boxes in the differential characteristics of E 0 (Note that for the active S-box in round 5, all the 127 possible output differences are used to derive 127 characteristics), and the probability can be computed asp = (
For the differential characteristic of E 1 , there are 5 active S-boxes and the probability isq = (2 −6 ) 5 = 2 −30 . In total, the distinguisher holds with probability (2 −51.
. Moreover, the differences after the MC operations (denoted in gray) are given as:
5 Attack on 8-Round Rijndael-160/160
By using the 6-round distinguisher for round 2-7 given in Subsection 4, we now present a key recovery attack on 8-round Rijndael-160/160 (round 1-8). Based on Fig. 7 , an adversary aims to collect sufficient plaintext quartets such that among these plaintext quartets there are averagely 4 right quartets with respect to the 6-round distinguisher. Then among all the collected plaintext quartets, the expected number of quartets satisfying the input and output differences of this distinguisher for a random permutation is (4/2 −251 ) · 2 −320 = 2 −67 . From this the adversary could distinguish the correct value from the wrong guessed values of the subkey bytes adopted in rounds 1 and 8 which are related to the 6-round distinguisher with a high probability. The attack procedure is divided into two phases: data collection phase and key recovery phase. Data Collection 
) in an efficient way, such that (P a , P b , P c , P d ), (C a , C b , C c , C d ) satisfy the input and output differences of rounds 1 and 8, respectively, as shown in Fig. 7 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 3e 1f 1f 1f 1f 1f 1f 1f 1f 1f 1f
and then extract the 88-bit value η. After that, insert the ciphertext and its structure index into the set S • The structure indices of C a and C b are the same, and the structure indices of C c and C d are the same. We obtain around (2
and their plaintext quartets (P a , P b , P c , P d ) in this step.
-For each of the 2 107 quartets (C a , C b , C c , C d ), check whether the following conditions
hold or not. If not, discard the quartet. The expected number of remaining quartets after this step is about 2
, respectively, and finally we get about 2 43 ·4 = 2 45 ciphertext quartets (C a , C b , C c , C d ) and their plaintext quartets (P a , P b , P c , P d ). Table 2 . For each of the remaining quartets in substeps (a)-(b), test whether the corresponding equations
Key Recovery

Guess the subkey bytes (K a
are satisfied or not. If not, discard the quartet. After this step, the number of remaining quartets is about 2 45 · (2 −8 ) 4 = 2 13 .
Guess the subkey bytes (K
and obtain the values of (K Table 2 . Then for each remaining quartet (C a , C b , C c , C d ), verify whether the following equations
hold or not. If not, remove the quartet.
7. If the number of the remaining quartets after above steps is two or more, output the corresponding 14 guessed subkey bytes ( 
Analysis of the attack
In Step 6, ten equations (each with probability 2 −8 ) need to be satisfied. Therefore, for a wrong guess of the above 14 subkey bytes, the expected number of quartets after Step 6 is 2 13 · (2 −8 ) 10 = 2 −67 . On the other hand, for a right guess of the key, the expected number of right quartets is about 4. This means that we can discard all the wrong subkeys (since the expected number of remaining quartets for a wrong subkey is 2 −67 ) and find the right 14 subkey bytes.
The probability of outputting a wrong key guess in Step 7 is derived by the following Poisson distribution:
, the expected number of wrong key guesses suggested in Step 7 is about (2 8 ) 14 ·2 −135 = 2 −23 , and the wrong key information can be easily removed in Step 8. Similarly, the probability that two or more quartets remain after Step 7 for the correct key guess is also computed by the Poisson distribution:
Since Pr[X ≥ 2] ≈ 0.91, the success probability of the attack on 8-round Rijndael-160/160 is approximately 91%.
Complexity Issues
The data complexity of this attack is 2 bytes.
The time complexity of the attack can be derived as follows:
-For the data collection phase, the time complexity comes from Step 2 and Step 4.
• • The time complexity of Step 8 is about 2 128 8-round Rijndael-160/160 encryptions.
As a result, the total time complexity of the attack is approximately 2 129.28 8-round Rijndael-160/160 encryptions.
Attack on 10-Round Rijndael-192/192
By using the 8-round distinguisher for round 2-9 given in Subsection 4, we now present a key recovery attack on 10-round Rijndael-192/192 (round 1-10). Based on Fig. 8 , an adversary needs to collect sufficient plaintext quartets such that among these plaintext quartets there are averagely 8 right quartets with respect to the 8-round distinguisher. Then among all the collected plaintext quartets, the expected number of quartets satisfying the input and output differences of this distinguisher for a random permutation is (8/2 −355 ) · 2 −384 = 2 −26 . From this the adversary could distinguish the correct value from the wrong guessed values of the subkey bytes adopted in rounds 1 and 10 which are related to the 8-round distinguisher with a high probability. The attack procedure is divided into two phases: data collection phase and key recovery phase. Data Collection 
plaintext quartets meeting the input difference of round 1 given in Fig. 8 . Similarly we can obtain 2 160 · N 2 plaintext quartets satisfying the input difference of round 1 for (
plaintext quartets in total. Among these plaintext quartets there are about
) in an efficient way, such that (P a , P b , P c , P d ), (C a , C b , C c , C d ) satisfy the input and output differences of rounds 1 and 10, respectively, as shown in Fig. 8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 3e 00 1f 1f 1f 1f 1f 00 1f 1f 1f 1f 1f
and then extract the 112-bit value η. After that, insert the ciphertext and its structure index into the set S • Let δ 1 , δ 2 , . . . , δ 127 denote all possible output differences of the S-Box for the input difference 01.
For each ciphertext in S c η , xor it with 00 21 21 21 21 21 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
and then extract the 48-bit value θ. After that, insert the ciphertext and its structure index into the set S • The structure indices of C a and C b are the same, and the structure indices of C c and C d are the same. With the above procedure we obtain around (2
, respectively, and finally we get about 2 130 · 4 = 2 132 ciphertext quartets (C a , C b , C c , C d ) and their plaintext quartets (P a , P b , P c , P d ).
Key Recovery
5. Guess the subkey bytes (K a ) j,5 , (K c ) j,5 (j ∈ {2, 3, 0}) as follows:
(a) Guess the subkey bytes (K a ) 2,5 , (K c ) 2,5 . According to the key schedule and Table 3 , derive (∆K ab ) 1,0 , (∆K cd ) 1,0 as below:
(b) Guess the subkey bytes (K a ) 3,5 , (K c ) 3, 5 . Similarly, compute (∆K ab ) 2,0 , (∆K cd ) 2,0 in terms of the key schedule and Table 3 . (c) Guess the subkey bytes (K a ) 0,5 , (K c ) 0,5 . Calculate (∆K ab ) 3,0 , (∆K cd ) 3,0 from the key schedule and Table 3 . 6. Guess the subkey bytes (K a ) 0,4 , (K c ) 0,4 . Then for each remaining quartet (P a , P b , P c , P d ), check whether the equations
hold or not. If not, remove the quartet. The expected number of remaining quartets after this step is
7. Guess the subkey bytes (
Then for each remaining quartet (P a , P b , P c , P d ), test whether the equations 
Then for each remaining quartet (C a , C b , C c , C d ), verify whether the equations 11. If the above 22 subkey bytes are retrieved after Step 10, perform an exhaustive search over all possible values of the remaining 152 bits of K a so as to recover the secret key.
Analysis of the attack
The expected number of remaining quartets after each substep in Step 9 is given as (a) . On the other hand, for a right guess of the key, the expected number of right quartets is 8.
The probability of outputting a wrong key guess in Step 10 is derived by the following Poisson distribution:
X ∼ P oi(λ = 2 −26 ).
As Pr[X ≥ 6] ≈ 2 −165.49 , the expected number of wrong key guesses suggested in
Step 10 is about (2 8 ) 22 · 2 −165.49 = 2 10.51 , and the wrong key information can be removed in Step 11. Similarly, the probability that six or more quartets remain after Step 9 for the correct key guess is also computed by the Poisson distribution:
X ∼ P oi(λ = 8).
Since Pr[X ≥ 6] ≈ 0.81, the success probability of the attack on 10-round Rijndael-192/192is approximately 81%.
Complexity Issues
The The time complexity of the attack can be derived as follows:
• 
